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Racial discrimination in Major League 
Baseball, can it exist when productivity is 
crystal clear? 
Will Irwin 
Department ofEconomics, Illinois Wesleyan University 
Honors Thesis, Spring 2004 
Minority workers in many industries have dealt with wage and hiring discrimination. In 
Major League Baseball, it is typically assumed that fair hiring practices are used and that 
fair wages are offered due to the intense negotiation process involved with each player 
contract. However, past research shows that both wage and hiring discrimination has 
been present during some recent time periods. With most industries, racial discrimination 
is difficult to measure due to the implicit bias in the productivity variables. However, in 
baseball, productivity can be easily measured with offensive and defensive performance 
statistics, which are determined completely independent of race. This paper attempts to 
use a human capital theory based regression and chi-squared analysis to determine 
whether or not racial wage and hiring discrimination is present among outfielders in 
Major League Baseball. The key findings are that offensive production and games 
played are the determinants of salary, while race is not and that racial hiring 
discrimination is not present for the data used. 
I. Introduction 
Major League Baseball (MLB) players make millions ofdollars a year to playa 
game. The players come from all over the world to the United States' largest cities to 
perform in front ofmillions of fans each year. From children in the Dominican Republic 
playing on gravel fields with broomsticks for bats, socks for balls, and milk jugs for 
gloves to children in the wealthy suburbs of southern California, little boys grow up 
dreaming ofplaying for their favorite team. Typically these dreams revolve around 
hitting a home run to win the World Series or making a diving catch to save a game, and 
for extremely underprivileged children the promise of large contracts to bring their entire 
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family out of poverty, provide extra inspiration to make it to the big leagues. But are 
their dreams tainted by the specter of discrimination? 
American labor markets have a long history of racial discrimination. In labor 
markets, this discrimination often takes the fonn of pay discrimination and/or hiring 
discrimination. Affinnative action programs and equal employment opportunity laws 
have been instituted to ensure that minority races are not discriminated against during the 
hiring process. However, affinnative action programs and equal employment litigation 
are rare to nonexistent in professional sports, and little has been done by the government 
to guarantee that minority players receive pay equal to that of their white teammates. 
Human capital theory demonstrates that, on average, workers should be paid 
according to their likely productivity. However, in many industries, productivity is hard 
to measure. Rather than measure productivity directly, researchers use proxies such as 
education, previous work experience, and on-the-job training. Since minorities have 
often been discriminated against their entire lives in education and training, it becomes 
very difficult to accurately measure discrimination in the work force. All of the proxies 
for productivity have implicit racial bias built into them, which blurs the data and makes 
any finding on discrimination biased. With baseball, the proxies are a more direct 
measure of productivity and do not fall victim to the problems found with using 
traditional proxies which are more indirect measures of productivity. 
With Major League Baseball, productivity factors that would be included in a 
human capital theory based equation might include things such as home runs, runs batted 
in, batting average, years of major league experience, and defensive ability. When a 
white player hits 50 home runs it should theoretically be treated the same as when a 
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Latino player hits 50 home runs, which makes for variables that have no implicit bias. 
Another benefit ofusing MLB players to assess the state of racial wage discrimination is 
that many players, including some of the top players in the league, come from the poorest 
areas in Latin America, which shows that professional baseball is an industry with little 
class resistance. In many industries, where advanced levels of education are necessary, it 
is virtually impossible for a child from a poverty stricken country to attain employment in 
that industry. Examples might include doctors, lawyers, accountants, and business 
executives. Since MLB, as an industry, does not depend on education, but on athletic 
ability, a trait that can develop in even the poorest of circumstances, it does not fall 
victim to built in class biases. 
By studying racial discrimination in MLB, I hope to show that it does not exist. 
Since baseball teams that discriminate would only end up hurting their chances of 
winning, it seems that there is a strong incentive to use fair hiring practices and to 
provide fair wages. Also, the strong influence of agents on contract negotiations should 
insure that all contracts are awarded solely on the basis of performance. I hypothesize 
that racial discrimination does not exist in MLB and that race is not a significant 
predictor of players' salaries after controlling for productivity. I also hypothesize that 
firms do not discriminate against minority players when making hiring decisions. 
The following section, Section II, discusses some of the past research about 
discrimination in professional sports. Section III presents my theoretical model, and then 
Section IV develops my empirical model. Section V shows my variables and the 
regression model. Section VI describes my data sources and gives some critique of their 
usefulness. Section VII presents my results from the regression equations, and Section 
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VIII outlines the results of the chi-square analysis. Finally, Section IX discusses the 
conclusions reached from the results and any possible policy implications that may be 
needed. 
II. Literature Review 
In 1957, Gary Becker produced the seminal work for the economic study of 
discrimination, The Economics ofDiscrimination. The theory from his book will be 
discussed later in the Theoretical Model section. Many economists have used Becker's 
theories to perform empirical studies on various issues ofdiscrimination. 
Gwartney and Haworth (1974) examined hiring discrimination for the integration 
period ofMLB between 1947 and 1956. They compiled a statistic called "black player 
years" for each team and then compared it to games won for the 10 year time span. The 
results show that the teams with the five highest number ofblack player years held five of 
the six highest spots in the rankings for games won. The New York Yankees was the 
only team able to rank in the top six while taking a discriminatory position during 
integration. 
Medoff(1975) followed the research of Gwartney and Haworth by trying to 
discover what level ofwage discrimination existed in MLB for the 1968 season. His 
model found that racial wage discrimination was not present for his data, but Medoff 
recognized that wage discrimination was not the only type ofdiscrimination facing 
minority players. 
Prior to 1947, an absolute barrier to entry existed for all nonwhite players. An 
important research question for the years that followed was whether or not barriers to 
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entry into MLB persisted after the color barrier was broken. Medoff recognized that even 
though owners might have paid the nonwhite players they have hired fair wages does not 
mean that they were hiring as many nonwhite players as deserved to be hired. In order to 
test this possibility, he examined whether or not nonwhite career statistics variables were 
significantly better than white career statistics. If nonwhites did perform better than 
whites, the fact that there were many more white players in the league than nonwhite 
would suggest that nonwhite players were not being hired as much as they should have 
been. The data were divided between the two leagues since the American League (AL) 
had integrated more slowly than the National League (NL). He postulated that the league 
with the faster entry rate should have statistically greater productivity for nonwhite 
players because the faster entry rate suggests that they have greater access to the better 
nonwhite players. The slower entry league would thus have a productivity for nonwhite 
players which would be closer to the true mean value, and if this value is not statistically 
different from that of the white players in that league, then it can be said that no barriers 
to entry exist (Medoff, 1975). 
The results showed that the rates of entry were indeed significantly different 
showing that the NL did have better access to nonwhite players. The nonwhite players in 
the NL were significantly more productive than both the white NL players and the 
nonwhite AL players. Furthermore, the AL nonwhites were not significantly more 
productive than AL whites. These results show that no barriers to entry existed for 
nonwhite players in the AL for this data. 
In an article by Bodvarsson and Pettman (2002), entitled "Racial wage 
discrimination in major league baseball: do free agency and league size matter?" pitchers 
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are used to detennine whether or not racial wage discrimination exists. This study uses a 
logarithmic regression model with variables such as race (white or non-white), population 
of the player's metropolitan area, productivity variables, and racial make-up of the 
player's metropolitan area. Since the study dealt with pitchers, the performance variables 
are very different. Examples include: wins, losses, saves, strikeouts, and earned run 
average. The study attempts to find out whether or not the addition of more teams to 
MLB would eliminate any racial discrimination that existed. The theory was that more 
teams would increase the level of competition between teams for good players, thereby 
causing teams to offer fair wages to get the best players. The results of this study show 
that expansion in 1993 did indeed eliminate discrimination for pitchers. 
A study by Fizel, Krautman, and Hadley (2002), "Equity and Arbitration in Major 
League Baseball," looks at a theory called "Equity Theory", which states that workers 
compare their efforts to their co-workers that are in comparable situations and then adjust 
their behavior based on that comparison. They hypothesize that MLB players look to 
players of similar abilities to decide how much they should earn when they file for 
arbitration and free agency. The study uses both regression and bivariate techniques to 
detennine whether or not a player will decide to file for arbitration. The results indicate 
that players do look at their co-workers performance and salary when they apply for 
arbitration. They do not include a measure of race in their study. If they had, perhaps 
they might have found whether minority players make different decisions than white 
players on this topic, but by demonstrating that MLB players look at their peers' wages 
when negotiating, they suggest a mechanism for how market forces can drive the system 
to long run equilibrium where minority players receive equal wages to whites. 
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In the context of the current literature, it is extremely important to test for the 
presence of wage discrimination amongst MLB outfielders. Since no such research is 
currently available, this issue must be analyzed to ensure that minority players are being 
treated fairly. Additionally, in order to complete the study, the presence of hiring 
discrimination must also be tested for. 
III. Theoretical Model 
The theoretical basis for this research comes from Gary Becker's work on 
discrimination and from Human Capital Theory. 
Becker's theory was based on the premise that discrimination was not about 
conspiracies against minorities or irrational business practices, but rather that 
discrimination arose as a result of the ''tastes'' of individual employers. In the case of 
baseball, if a team owner has a taste for discrimination against Latino players, he will 
experience a decrease in utility each time he signs a Latino player. This decrease in 
utility will be represented in two possible ways: a lower wage for Latino's or fewer 
Latino players on the team. The team owner with the taste for discrimination will then 
end up paying white players, ofequal skill to the Latino, higher wages (Becker, 1971). 
Becker's theory indicates that the owners with a taste for discrimination will be 
less successful than nondiscriminatory employers. The theory behind this is that in a free 
market league, a minority player will receive offers from both discriminatory and 
nondiscriminatory owners, and since the discriminatory owners have a negative utility for 
signing minority players, the wage they offer will be lower than the nondiscriminatory 
owner. Therefore, the nondiscriminatory owner will be able to sign minority players 
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more often than the discriminatory owner, giving him a competitive advantage in 
building his roster. Also, since Becker's theory suggests that minority wages will be 
lower than white wages, nondiscriminatory finns will have lower labor costs. This cost 
advantage also gives the nondiscriminatory finn a competitive advantage (Becker, 1971). 
In the long run, lower labor costs put nondiscriminatory finns at an advantage 
over discriminatory finns. As discriminatory finns decrease in number and 
nondiscriminatory finns increase in number, the demand for minority players increases 
which causes their wages to increase. This process continues until wages are equal 
between white and minority players. Also, in the long run, nondiscriminatory employers 
will integrate their finns since white and black wages become equal for each skill level 
(Becker, 1971). 
According to Becker, employers may also respond to employee and consumer 
prejudice in their hiring decisions. If a team owner in MLB is a profit maximizer, as he 
should be assumed to be, he will put players on the team that his fans want to watch and 
that his employees want to work with. We would expect that minorities would be 
underrepresented on those teams where these prejudices exist. If employers respond to 
consumer and employee prejudice, there will be lower demand for minority players and 
their wages will be lower. Thus, consumer and employee prejudice has the same short 
run implication as employer discrimination. In the long run however, Becker argues that 
competitive forces should still eliminate the effect of these prejudices just as they 
eliminate the effects of employer prejudices. Later in the paper, we look for evidence of 
consumer prejudice by exploring whether the distribution ofplayers on teams does not 
vary across cities, even though those cities have vastly different racial compositions. 
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Becker's theory of employer discrimination indicates that hiring discrimination 
results from firms who have a negative utility for hiring minority workers. This negative 
utility will cause them to hire minority workers at a lower rate than nondiscriminatory 
firms. Therefore, on average, the discriminatory firms should have fewer minority 
workers. 
Thus, in the short run, Becker's theory predicts the possibility of wage 
differentials and racial segregation. The work by Haworth and Gwartney cited above 
suggests that this is exactly what was happening in MLB during the 1950's. 
However, Becker's theory of discrimination suggests very different outcomes in 
the long run. The theory states that both wage differentials and racial segregation should 
be eliminated by market forces (Becker, 1971). It has been 57 years since Jackie 
Robinson broke the color barrier in 1947, which should be enough time to reach a long 
run equilibrium. Thus, we would hypothesize that MLB has reached a long run 
equilibrium and that after controlling for differences in human capital between players 
there should be no remaining wage differentials or hiring discrimination. 
Since it is essential to control for human capital differences between major league 
players in order to determine whether racial wage differentials exist, it is important to 
have a grasp ofhuman capital theory. Human Capital Theory is used to explain how 
productivity factors of a worker's history influence how much they are paid in their jobs. 
"Human capital" is seen as the result of investment. People can invest in schooling in 
order to increase their level ofhuman capital. Similarly, firms can invest in on-the-job 
training for their workers. Since education increases a worker's knowledge and skills 
that can be applied to a job, theory suggests that this increase in knowledge will allow the 
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worker to be more productive, which will give them the ability to bargain for higher 
wages (Rima, 1981). Firms will pay higher wages since the marginal productivity of 
their business will be increased with the addition of more human capital to their work 
force. Also, since investing in human capital can have costs, such as tuition for schooling 
and the opportunity cost of lost wages during the time period of schooling, employers can 
be forced to pay higher wages to people with more human capital (Mincer, 1958). 
In a traditional work setting, the factors that go into human capital would include 
educational attainment level, years of work experience, on-the-job training, and age. All 
of these variables theoretically should give an indication of how productive a worker will 
be. Once an employer knows how productive the worker will be, he/she can pay them a 
wage that is fair for that level ofproductivity. 
For baseball players, the factors that employers look at to determine salary are 
very different from the traditional job market. Since players are simply born with innate 
abilities, they are compensated for their natural ability to produce in an athletic industry. 
However, just as job experience is a form of human capital investment for traditional 
industries, the amount of time training and playing high-level professional baseball 
should be an important human capital determinant for baseball players. Athletic talent 
should be considered more of an amplifier of this training and experience than a form of 
human capital for baseball players. 
Therefore, a human capital model for baseball will have some different factors, 
but the factors in the model will represent productivity in the same way that education, 
experience, training, etc. do in a traditional human capital model. 
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In conclusion, given Gary Becker's model ofdiscrimination and the human 
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capital theory of wage determination, I hypothesize: 
1)	 According to Becker's theory ofdiscrimination in the long run, there will be no 
statistically significant wage differences between white and minority players after 
controlling for productivity differences. 
2)	 According to Becker's theory ofdiscrimination in the long run, there will be no 
statistically significant differences in racial distribution among teams. 
IV. Empirical Model 
Hiring Discrimination 
In order to determine whether or not baseball teams discriminate in their hiring 
practices, chi-squared analysis will be used to compare the distributions ofminority and 
majority players across teams. 
Wage Discrimination 
In order to determine whether there is racial wage discrimination, dummy 
variables for race are included in a regression model that also controls for productivity 
differences across players. 
Equation 1. 
Wage =f (productivity, race) 
Productivity depends on innate ability and a set of investments in human capital. 
In MLB, unlike other industries, productivity can be measured directly by performance 
statistics such as runs batted in, home runs, and batting average. Also important in 
determining productivity are experience related variables such as games played and age. 
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More experienced players may generate more revenue for the club independent of their 
productivity because they have loyal fans who are more likely to attend games and 
purchase other team sponsored goods. 
When studying race as a determinant of wage compensation, it is important to 
account for individual differences in productivity due to the factors mentioned above in 
order to determine whether or not race has an effect. Since, theoretically, race alone 
should not affect a person's productivity, it would be expected that different races would 
receive equal pay, ceteris paribus. 
In order to determine whether or not MLB players are receiving fair pay, race is 
included as one of the determinant variables. Other determinant variables account for 
traditional productivity factors. These include measures for offensive and defensive 
ability, experience, and reliability of future production. 
It is important to note that MLB teams are located in major cities across the 
country which range widely in size from New York City, with a metropolitan area of over 
20 million people, to Milwaukee, with a metropolitan area just over one million people 
(www.Census.gov). Since teams in smaller cities would have to pay just as much as 
teams in large cities to attract players, some may say that it is doubtful that a team in a 
small market can pay a player equally well as a large market team due to the large 
differences in total revenues. However, for the purpose of this study, it is assumed that a 
player would not accept a lower salary to play in a small market, and, therefore, that all 
salary figures are true values awarded for the level ofproductivity that is expected of the 
player. Given this assumption, no measure ofmarket size is included in the model. 
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-Conceptually, a players contract value could be thought of depending on several 
categories ofvariables: 
Equation 2. 
Player Contract Value = f (offensive ability, defensive ability, experience, race) 
From this equation, I build a regression equation that I use to test my hypothesis that 
racial discrimination does not exist in MLB. This hypothesis combines implications of 
Gary Becker's theory of discrimination and ideas from Human Capital Theory. Recall 
that Becker's theory suggests that, in the long run, racial wage differences should 
disappear as a result of competitive forces in the labor market. Human Capital Theory 
suggests that wage differences between players should reflect differences in actual 
productivity. Thus, the first research hypothesis is that after controlling for differences in 
productivity, race will not be a significant determinant ofplayer contract value. Also, 
Becker's theory of discrimination suggests that in the long-run teams should not be 
segregated. Thus, the second research hypothesis is that the racial distribution should not 
differ significantly across clubs. 
V. Variables and Regression Model 
The regression model for wage discrimination will take the pieces described in the 
theoretical model and apply them specifically to the research problem by using the 
available data. The data, which are described in detail in Section VI, consists of 52 
outfielders who were eligible for free agency status and signed a new contract between 
1997 and 2003. 
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The dependent variable is salary. The measure for this variable consists of a one­
year contract value, the first year of a new contract. The number of years of the contract 
is not included. This is unfortunate because length of contract could be another variable 
in which discrimination could playa role. However, data for length of contract are not 
readily available. 
The regression equation attempts to account for different aspects of a player's 
abilities. For the purpose oflimiting the data and eliminating positional biases, only 
outfielders are used in the study. Typically, a player is judged by scouts and general 
managers on the basis of "five tools": (1) Hitting for average (2) Hitting for power (3) 
Ability to steal (4) Ability to catch (5) Ability to throw. 
1. Offensive Statistics and Variables 
Offensive productivity is typically measured by traditional statistics like batting 
average, runs batted in, runs scored, home runs, and steals. The problem with using such 
statistics is that they do not fully capture the ability of all players to contribute to their 
teams. For example, Player A plays for a team in which the players in front of him and 
behind him in the line-up all hit for high average and power, while Player B plays for a 
team in which the players immediately surrounding him in the lineup all hit for poor 
average and power. If Player A and Player B have exactly the same inherent offensive 
capability, but are playing with these different teammates, Player A will have higher runs 
scored and runs batted in numbers because there will be more men on base ahead of him 
to drive in and better hitters behind him in order to drive him in. Some may say that this 
effect will only bias the runs scored and runs batted in measures of performance, but it is 
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generally asswned and widely accepted that home runs and batting average can also be 
positively and negatively influenced depending on the players surrounding a player in the 
line-up. In order to insure that statistical studies ofbaseball hitters are not flawed due to 
this "team influence" a statistic has been created by baseball scholar Bill James called 
"Runs Created" (www.baseballstuff.com). 
The formula for Runs Created has many different variations. It has been changed 
many times by its creator and also by other researchers that have used it. For this study, 
the most basic formula is used due to the availability ofdata from www.baseball­
reference.com, which has already calculated the Runs Created nwnbers. The formula 
used is as follows: 
Equation 3.
 
Runs Created = (Hits + Walks) *Total Bases / Plate Appearances
 
"Total bases" is defined as the nwnber of bases reached by a player due to hits, so 
for a single: total bases = 1, a double = 2, a triple = 3, and a home run = 4. "Plate 
appearances" is the total nwnber of times a player comes to the plate. It differs from "At 
bats" because "At bats" subtracts out walks, sacrifices, and hits-by-pitch. "At bats" is the 
statistic used to calculate batting average (www.sports-wired.com). 
Runs Created is an attempt to estimate a player's total contribution to his team's 
total output. It tries to eliminate the "double-counting effect" that occurs when a run is 
scored. To explain, each time a run is scored, the player who actually crosses the plate 
gets credit for a "run scored", while the player that got the hit to drive the other player in 
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gets credit for a "run batted in." Statistically, the run is counted twice. Therefore, the 
players on a team that scores 700 runs in a season might have a sum of 1400 runs scored 
and runs batted in (minus special cases where runs score without a run batted in being 
awarded). In order to try to measure which players on each team are actually most 
responsible for the total offensive output, the Runs Created variable gives one player 
more credit than the other when each run is scored (www.wfu.edu).This principle is 
further illustrated with this hypothetical situation: 
Player A hits a triple to lead offan inning. Player B sacrifices Player A home 
with a longfly ball to centerfield. In this situation, the statistical breakdown 
would be: Player A -1 hit in 1 at batfor a 1.000 batting average and 1 run 
scored, Player B - 0 hits in 0 at bats for no change to his batting average and 1 
run batted in (sacrifice fly outs do not count as an official at bat). Ifthese 
players 'statistics are compared, Player A would only receive a slight advantage 
over Player B in the batting average category. Their run production would be 
considered equal. 
This example of traditional stat-keeping shows how the player that "did the most" in the 
scoring of the run does not earn the credit that he might technically deserve. Runs 
Created solves this problem by giving "extra credit" to Player A by giving him 3 total 
bases and giving Player B 0 total bases. 
For regression analysis, Runs Created appears to be a good alternative to 
traditional statistics as a measure of offensive productivity because it eliminates some of 
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the team bias that is implicit in the data. Also, by reducing the number of independent 
variables in the regression, using Runs Created saves valuable degrees of freedom. 
In order to further nonnalize the variable, each players' total Runs Created, for 
the years before they sign their contract, is divided by the number of games they have 
played and then multiplied by 162 (the number of games in a full season). This should 
show their average ability to produce offensively. 
The ability to steal is measured, obviously, with a steals statistic. The same 
procedure used with Runs Created is also used with steals. Each player's steals value 
shows the number of steals they have had on average per 162 game season. On a side 
note, this statistic could be extremely interesting due to the fact that some players' main 
purpose for being in a line-up is to steal bases. It will be interesting to see ifthese 
stealing specialists are rewarded for their rare talent. 
2. Defensive Variables 
The defensive productivity measures, such as the ability to catch and to throw, are 
a little more difficult to quantify. For the ability to catch, the most commonly used 
statistic is fielding percentage, but the problem with this statistic is that some slower 
players do not have the opportunity to attempt to make difficult plays and therefore end 
up having higher fielding percentages than the faster, flashier fielders. This problem is 
virtually unavoidable with the data, so fielding percentage will not be included in the 
regression. 
The ability to throw can be easily quantified with outfield assists. An assist is 
awarded to a player when they throw the ball to another player and this action results in 
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an out, force or tag. For outfielders, this statistic is extremely important to their overall 
defensive ability. For the model, assists are included as a 162-game average, calculated 
in the same way as the offensive statistics described above. 
3. Experience Variables 
In order to account for the traditional Human Capital Theory variable of 
experience, the number of games played in the MLB league will be included in the 
regression equation. Since many players playa few games in a year before playing their 
first full year, it would be impossible to include a variable such as years of experience. 
Number of games played will clearly differentiate between young players and veterans, 
while also allowing all available statistics prior to contract signing to be used in 
calculating potential productivity. 
An element ofproductivity that has nothing to do with the game ofbaseball but 
will still have an impact on the human-capital thought processes that general managers 
have when deciding how much money to give to a player is age. Often times, a younger 
player will be awarded a large amount ofmoney over a long period of time, while an 
older player may receive a one or two year contract worth an extremely large amount of 
money. Since no research has been found on how age affects the awarding of salaries in 
MLB, it is uncertain what affect age will have in the regression equation. On one hand, 
older workers have more experience, even after controlling for games played. Thus, 
wages would be directly related to age. On the other hand, reflexes slow and the 
probability of injury increases with age. Thus, wages would be expected to be inversely 
related to age. Given these opposite effects, the sign on age is indeterminant. 
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4. Racial Variables 
For this category ofvariables, dummy variables must be used. For both black and
 
Latino players, a one or a zero is used to designate a player in either ofthose racial
 
categories. Being white is the omitted variable. The placement ofplayers into these
 
categories was completed by judgments based on country oforigin, physical appearance,
 
and surname.
 
Variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The following equation
 
will be estimated using OLS:
 
Player Salary = aJ + PJ(RC) + P2(ASSIST) + P3( STEALS) + P4( GP) + P5( AGE) + 
P6(BLACK) + P7(LATINO) 
Table 1: Variables and Descriptions 
Dependent Description Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
Variable 
Salary Value of Contract 2,440,064.1 7,550,000 250,000 1,985,099.9 
Independent 
Variables 
(Expected Sign) 
RC(+) (Runs Created / GP) * 162 78.1 125.6 39.9 20.9 
ASSIST (+) (Assists / GP) * 162 9.1 16.7 2.8 3.8 
STEALS (+) (Steals / GP) * 162 17.3 61.6 1.0 13.7 
GP(+) Games played before contract 523.5 982 168 208.7 
was awarded 
AGE (+ or-) Age on July 1st of the year 27.9 34 23 2.3 
contract was awarded 
BLACK (0) 1 = Black, 0 = Other .37 1 0 .486 
LATINO (0) 1 = Latino, 0 = Other .33 1 0 .474 
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VI. Data 
The sample consists of 52 outfielders who have achieved free agency status and 
signed a new contract between 1997 and 2003. Free agency status occurs after a player 
has been under contract to a major league team for six years. After those six years, as a 
free agent, the player has the option to negotiate with any team he wishes. Thus, free 
agent wages are determined purely according to market forces. 
The wonderful thing about working with MLB data is that people are fanatical 
about keeping track of statistics about every aspect of the game. From offensive statistics 
to defensive statistics, to player salaries and free agent filings, all of the data found in this 
paper is readily accessible on reputable and reliable websites. It is important to note the 
ease of Internet research when working with baseball statistics. Efficiency is drastically 
increased due to the extreme quickness by which player data can be found on these 
websites. Additionally, definitions of statistics and explanations ofhow to interpret them 
are found easily on the Internet. 
The data for offensive and defensive statistics can be found on www.Baseball­
Reference.com. This website is basically an encyclopedia ofbaseball players and has 
records of almost every player that has ever played in the major leagues. 
Data for player salaries can be found at a website run by the chairman of the 
Business of Baseball Committee of the Society for American Baseball Research 
(www.roadsidephotos.com). The site is particularly useful in determining when the 
players had received their salary payments as a result of a free agent signing because it 
has a list ofall free agent filings made by players. Using this list, the year in which the 
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player entered the free agent market can be found and their performance data from the 
previous years can be used to determine on what basis their new contract was awarded. 
The data for the race variable is less concrete. In many cases the player's country 
of origin (www.baseball-reference.com) will indicate into which category they should be 
placed. For example, all players from the Dominican Republic are considered to be 
Latino. The same can be said for players from any other country in Central and South 
America. For minority players born in the United States, the distinction is more difficult 
to make. Typically, a determination can be made based on the origin of the player's last 
name. A name ofHispanic origin would tend to indicate that the player is Latino. 
Conversely, a recognizable "American name" would categorize the player as black. Two 
cases where no determination could be made with some certainty are excluded. 
The data for the hiring discrimination portion of the study was also found using 
www.Baseball-Reference.com.This website lists complete team rosters. From the 
rosters, the number ofplayers of each race that a team has employed for a given year can 
be determined. The same method as was described before was used to determine the race 
of each individual player. For this test, player rosters from the 2000 season were used. 
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VII. Regression Results 
For independent variables, the unstandardized coefficients, t-statistics, and 
significance values are presented below in Table 2. 
II Table 2. Coefficients and Significance 
(Constant) 
RC 
ASSIST 
STEALS 
GP 
AGE 
BLACK 
LATINO 
RZ = .545, n = 52 
I
 
B Std. Error I t Sig. 
-1,319,631 3,248,449.0 -.406 .687 
43,127.6 13,601.4 3.171 .003 
-21,341.3 67,442.0 -.316 .753 
-520.7 17,834.0 -.029 .977 
5,447.6 1,324.3 4.114 .000 
-90,453.0 108,941.0 -.830 .411 
555,729.0 525,330.0 1.058 .296 
202,386.1 506,230.1 .400 .691 
The two significant variables are Runs Created and Games Played. The rest are 
not significant with extremely low significance values. 
Runs Created has a significance value of .003 and, as expected, a positive 
coefficient of43,128, indicating that an additional run created results in 43,128 more 
dollars in the value ofa player's contract. To put this in perspective, adding a Runs 
Created value of 10 for a season would add $430,127 to a player's salary. The average 
Runs Created value for the sample is 78.2. Traditionally, a season of 100 runs created is 
considered a very good season. 
The other significant variable, Games Played, has a positive coefficient of5,448 
and a significance value of .000. This variable indicates that an additional year of 
experience (162 more games played) should translate, on average, into 882,511 more 
dollars. In order to test for possible nonlinearities, a regression was run which included a 
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squared transformation of Games Played. Since the results from this regression were 
very poor, the squared term was dropped from the regression reported here. Since the 
group ofplayers that is used in this group is relatively young their games played numbers 
are also relatively low, it is to be expected that more experience will benefit these 
younger workers. The highest number of games played in this study is 982, so these 
results can only indicate a rate ofreturn on games played up to that point. After that the 
return to games played may become negative, reflecting the older age of the player, 
which may make a player less desirable. 
Steals, Assists, and Age are all not statistically significant variables in this 
regression. All of these variables were expected to have positive coefficients, but their 
low significance values suggest that the signs on the coefficients are relatively 
meaningless. Therefore, the regression results failed to show that steals, defense, and age 
are important determinants ofbaseball players' salaries. 
Most important for the purpose of this study are the race dummy variables, both 
ofwhich are not statistically significant. Since the variables are not significant, the signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients are not important. 
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Table 3. Coefficients and Significance 
(Constant) 
RC 
ASSIST 
STEALS 
GP 
AGE 
MINORITY 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
-2,056,674 3,055,410.1 -.673 .504 
42,380.2 13,482.2 3.143 .003 
-15,254.1 66,497.9 -.229 .820 
1357.7 17,530.4 .077 .939 
5,410.3 1,315.7 4.112 .000 
-63,860.5 101,514.7 -.629 .532 
365,410.1 446,860.1 .818 .296 
R = .550, n = 52 
In order to attempt to further show that race is not a factor in salary determination, 
a separate regression was run using a variable, MINORITY, instead of the broken up 
racial groups, black and Latino. The results are amazingly similar to the first regression. 
In both regressions, the only significant variables are Runs Created and Games Played. 
All other variables were not significant in both regressions. 
Race, no matter how it is defined, simply does not have an effect on salary for 
these data. 
VIII. Chi-Squared Results 
A chi-squared test was used to test for hiring discrimination by comparing the 
proportions of races on the 30 teams in MLB. By comparing the proportions, whether or 
not certain teams hire proportionately fewer minorities can be discerned. 
The chi-squared analysis comparing the number of players of each race on the 30 
MLB teams was not statistically significant. Since the employment distribution across 
teams is not statistically different, no hiring discrimination was apparent in the data. 
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IX. Conclusion 
•
 
The purpose of this study is to detennine whether or not racial discrimination 
exists in MLB for outfielders. After running the regressions and finding race variables 
that were not significant, it can be concluded that under this set of circumstances, racial 
wage discrimination does not exist for outfielders in MLB. Also, the chi-squared 
analysis did not detect racial hiring discrimination. It appears that MLB has reached the 
long run equilibrium that Becker hypothesized where players will be hired and paid 
fairly. The positive implications of this are obvious. It is an indication that if 
productivity is clear and unbiased in nature, employers will provide fair wages to all 
employees and will hire based solely on that productivity. Obviously, very few industries 
exist with such clear cut and easily measured productivity, but just the fact that minority 
workers are paid fairly when it is, is a positive sign for the state of the American social 
consciousness. 
It should be noted that we hesitate to generalize this research beyond baseball and 
potentially other major professional sports leagues. We fear that by generalizing without 
justification, more harm would be done than good by potentially down playing the 
importance of testing each industry individually for racial discrimination. Therefore, in 
those industries where productivity is easily measured (e.g. NFL, NBA, NHL, handicrafts 
industries, and some manufacturing industries) future research should be done to see if 
racial discrimination exists after controlling for productivity. However, while 
productivity is very easily measured in some industries, most do not exhibit such a large 
degree of transparency. It would be a mistake to generalize the results of this study to 
those industries. 
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Additional future research could examine total contract value, which would 
capture the length of contracts to see ifbaseball owners prefer one race to another for 
long tenn contracts. Additionally, researchers could expand the regression to include all 
positional players, to try to get a better representation of the entire league's salary 
structure. 
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